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We empirically investigate the factors that drive the uneven regional distribution 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to China’s 31 provinces from 1995 to 
2006. The aim of this paper is to explain the investment patterns in (partly) foreign 
funded firms across these provinces. We use factor analysis and derive four factors 
that may drive FDI: institutions, labor costs, market potential, and geography. The 
factor analysis then structures our dataset to concentrate on these four clusters 
consisting of 42 province specific and time -varying items. Factor analysis not only 
helps us to identify the latent dimensions which are not apparent from direct study, 
but also facilitates econometrics with reduced number of variables. We apply fixed 
effects panel estimation and GMM to account for endogeneity. In line with theoretical 
predictions we find that foreign investors choose and invest more in provinces with 
better institutions, lower labor costs, and larger market size. Nonlinear results 
denote that the positive effects of infrastructure and market potential on FDI are 
complementary to each other, which is in line with the economic geography 
literature. In particular the effect of market size on FDI is larger in provinces with 
better institutions. Sub-sample study confirms the existences of a large disparity 
between East and West. In the poorer large western provinces FDI is strongly driven 
by the geographical factor in contrast to the east of China where institutions play a 
significant role to build the ‘factory of the world’. Robustness tests indicate that 
two sub-dimensions of institutions, namely infrastructure and governance, are 
important to determine the location choice of FDI in China. 
 
Keywords: FDI, China, factors analysis, regional and spatial distribution of FDI, 
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Over the last decades, foreign direct investment has been an important engine for Chinese 
growth.  However, there are large differences in FDI patterns across Chinese regions. For 
example, the five special economic zones account for 80 percent of total FDI, whereas the 
combined five provinces in the North-West account for only 10 percent. Moreover, regions 
differ in the type of FDI they attract. Urban growth centers increasingly are magnates for 
market seeking FDI, whereas other regions are the factory of the world. Clearly, differences 
in FDI patterns across regions also explain internal discrepancies in economic development.  
Most papers that study Chinese FDI patterns take a traditional route of analyzing FDI from a 
specific theoretical angle and therefore focus on a limited number of determinants to 
explain the variation across regions. Some focus on geographical factors and agglomeration 
effects, labor costs or institutional quality. Further, as is often stressed in factor analysis, 
traditional empirical methods often use proxies for the underlying more general 
determinants that are potentially related to omitted variables, which hampers causal 
inference. Given these restrictions in focus and method, evidence on what explains the 
variation in FDI across Chinese regions is still incomplete. 
But there are more identification problems in the papers that deal with FDI in China. The 
obvious is reverse causality, since FDI inflows affect regional characteristics. Clearly, panel 
analysis can deal with this effectively, but such methods are difficult with for example firm 
level data. If one uses aggregate data at the provincial level, for fixed effects one needs a 
sufficiently long period in which many things happen, whereas for random effects one 
ideally would like a large number of cross sectional observations. In addition, when one 
prefers fixed effects (for example because the Hausman test would point that way) with 
limited cross sectional observation (regions)  one has limited degrees of freedom, which 
restricts the inclusion of variables, so that omitted variable bias may be rampant or at least 
results rely heavily on the specifications used.  If both time and number of regions are 
limited, there is a heavy trade-off. But even when one succeeds in running fixed effects, it 
then  is very likely to exclude many potentially important fixed factors that affects the 
distribution of FDI across regions, for example geographical characteristics. Clearly, with 3 
 
random effects one may counter the endogeneity problems, but the omitted variable return 
with a vengeance. 
In this paper, we aim to provide a more eclectic approach to analyzing FDI patterns  and  to 
deal with omitted variables and endogeneity problems  by combining conventional empirical 
methods and (less conventional) factor analysis.  Let us briefly explain our line of thinking, 
without claiming that it solves all the problems mentioned above.  We use data on FDI at the 
provincial level for the period 1995-2006. This is a period in which FDI spread from highly 
concentrated in the Pearl River Delta (PRD) and hence the Guangdong region to include 
more coastal regions as well as recently a move to the Western and Northern provinces.  
Before we regress provincial characteristics for which we have theoretical priors that they 
are correlated with FDI, we first ask to what extent provinces actually differ in their 
economic and social characteristics.  To this end, we perform a factor analysis where we 
include 42 variables common in the literature (see the next section on related literature), 
where the analysis shows which factors (clusters of variables) explain a large part of regional 
variance. Certainly we hope that a subset of factors cluster in a factor that can be related to 
economic theory: new economic geography, regional comparative a dvantage, new 
institutional economics and the like. We have to keep in mind that the factors are clusters of 
variables that change over time, although some of the variables are rather static. We have 
included many variables to explain a significant part of regional variance, so that we can be 
confident to indirectly control for many potentially omitted variables. 
After that, we run traditional panel estimations where we control for endogeneity by using 
GMM. Broadly speaking, the following results stand out. First, institutions, comparative 
advantage, and market size all matter, but there are important differences with respect to 
coastal and inner provinces and with respect to interaction effect among these factors. 
However, as a single factor, differences in comparative advantage and especially labor costs 
seem to matter most in explaining the FDI flows between 1995-2006. Hence, from a policy 
perspective one may argue that the efforts to spread investments towards regions with 
lower labor costs have succeeded.  Second, although governance and infrastructure cluster 
into one factor, especially infrastructure seems a precondition for comparative advantage in 
labor costs and market size to have a sizeable effect on FDI inflows. This calls for support of 4 
 
policies that promote (massive) infrastructural projects and support for local authorities in 
regions where FDI is low, such as the westerns and northern provinces. Lastly, we find no 
strong individual effect of better governance on FDI, other than its connection w ith an 
increased supply of public goods.  
The paper commences as follows. The next section discusses related literature with the aim 
of providing a theoretical foundation for our empirical research. Section 3 introduces the 
data and empirical strategy in more detail, with a special emphasis on the role of factor 
analysis in this paper. Following that, section 4 presents the core results. Then, section 5 
performs robustness checks on the main findings. Section 6 concludes the paper.   
2. Related literature 
FDI inflows into China are a widely studied subject. From the academic perspective, studying 
FDI to China attracts great interest because flows are high – so much is happening – and by 
focusing on a single large country one account for many variables that would may otherwise 
be omitted or at least imperfectly captured.  In addition, FDI inflows have created much 
policy debate within China because of its close links to growth diversion across regions, see 
e.g. Chan, Henderson and Tsui (2008).  
The start of the academic debate on FDI inflows in China is related the emergence of the 
new economic geography literature, associated with the work of Paul Krugman, Richard 
Baldwin and many other leading international economists in the 1980s. The central thinking 
is that firm location choice involves a trade-off between making use of positive externalities 
that come from agglomeration and the negative effects that agglomeration has on factor 
costs. Given that China in the 1980 opened up to foreign capital, agglomeration was (and still 
is) low, it provided an ideal study ground for studying the forces of the new economic 
geography.  
The seminal paper in this approach is Head and Ries (1996) who, controlling for geographical 
factors, find strong agglomeration effects in FDI decisions, concentrated in the coastal areas’ 
export processing zones. Many would follow in their footsteps. For example, recently Amiti 5 
 
and Javorcik (2008) use firm level data to analyze location decision and find effects of 
agglomeration and costs advantages on FDI decisions.
2  Ng  and Tuan (2006) study the 
mainland investment decision at the provincial level of firms from Hong Kong and also find 
agglomeration effects outside the nearby PRD region. The paper also provides a good 
overview of other studies on the new economic geography in China. The main conclusion 
from these papers is that (market) size, the presence of other firms and infrastructure, as 
well as labor costs are the main determinants of explaining the spatial dispersion of FDI. 
With respect to FDI inflows, Sethi and colleagues (2003) explore the Dunning model related 
to FDI using a factor analysis. Their results based on principal components shows two 
important determinants of FDI, namely “regional characteristics” and “market 
attractiveness”.  
In the 1990s, there emerges a new line of thinking that is much more skeptical on the 
powerful effects geography and the forces of the new economic geography may have on 
economic prosperity. The work of Daron Acemoglu, Anver Greif, and other instead stress the 
importance of institutions in economic development. Taking up this point, Cole, Elliott and 
Zhang (2006) show that when controlling for factors such as labor costs and geography, 
institutional variables such as control of corruption have a positive effect on attracting FDI. 
Local institutions may also refer to good property right protection (Cheung & Lin, 2004) and 
to local absorption capacity (Fu, 2008). In general, these studies stress that local institutional 
conditions play an important role in attracting FDI. 
A current wave is to put more emphasis on firm heterogeneity. Zhao and Zhang (2005) study 
different motives for source countries to become engaged in FDI to China. Where Zhao and 
Zhang (2005) concentrate on the macro motives (differences in labor costs, for example), Hu 
and Owen (2005) analyze firms level data. They show that firms from Hong Kong, Macau. 
and Taiwan (HMT) have different motives than firms from OECD countries. More specific, 
agglomeration effects are especially important for firms from OECD countries, whereas labor 
costs attract FDI from HMT firms. In addition Belderbos en Carree (2002) analyze investment 
behavior of Japanese firms in China and conclude that agglomeration effects are important 
                                                                 
2 With firm level data it is important to note that often they restrict the analysis to cross section only, since there 
are no investment patterns at the firm level recorded over time. But clearly reverse causality is a limited problem 
when using firm level data.  6 
 
for small firms, whereas large firms pay more attention to cost advantages. For our results it 
is important to keep in mind that over time FDI flows are driven by the fact that firms from 
OECD countries enter, existing firms become more acquainted in doing business in China and 
may be compared to firms from HMT, and that increasingly China is ‘discovered’ by medium 
sized firms. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Factor Analysis 
In order to identify a broad structure within dataset we perform a factor analysis. Using this 
method we extract and exhibit the chief core from the explanatory variables without any 
prejudice. The goal of the factor analysis is to study interrelationships between  the 42 
explanatory  variables and specify a new set of (latent) variables that expresses the 
‘communality’ among the original variables. It is widely applied in psychology, medicine, 
geology, biology,  sociology,  marketing and becoming more popular in economics and 
management studies (Boivin & Ng, 2006; Jöreskog, 2007).
3 
It has several advantages in our context. Factor analysis basically discerns patterns of 
association among the data. A complete set of interdependent relationships is examined 
such that the technique can describe the variability among observed variables in terms of 
fewer (unobserved) factors. So the data is reduced to a small set which accounts for most of 
the variance in the initial dataset and is translated to factors.  
Most other studies have a limited set of variables, derived from a theoretical angle, whereas 
our study takes advantage of the diversity of various variables. In addition, factor analysis 
decreases the degree of correlation (multicollinearity) between independent variables by 
reducing the number of variables to smaller set of uncorrelated (orthogonal) factor scores. 
Related to the reduction of variables is another distinction of factor analysis, namely that it 
produces neutral determinants of FDI measures, such that we overcome the selection bias 
                                                                 
3 As Rummel (2008) states: “factor analysis can simultaneously manage over a hundred variables, compensate 
for random error and invalidity, and disentangle complex interrelationships into their major and distinct 
regularities… [it] divides the regularity in the data into its distinct patterns.”  7 
 
typical in hypothesis testing research. For instance,  Easterly (2008) explains that with 
sufficient variables, you will always find an effect, because of problems of finding the true 
measures. The constructs of the factor analysis partial mitigate these types of problems. 
Because selection criteria in regression analysis easily leads to the conclusion that adding 
another variable does not add any explanatory power – conditional on the already included 
variables - factor analysis is unique in the sense that it a priori includes all variables. Actually 
for these reasons Hendry proposed to model from general to specific, however, this still 
cannot overcome the selection bias (Sala-i-Martin, 1997).  
Many studies in economics, for example those using VAR models, rely on a few pre-selected 
variables instead of applying large-scale models, because of restrictive assumptions about 
the joint distributions of all included variables. Likewise, inclusion of irrelevant information 
can have costs. Factor analysis uses a common-idosyncratic decomposition such that the 
empirical framework is kept small. As Bouvin and Ng (2006:170) state: “factor analysis 
provides a formal way of defining what type of variation is relevant for the panel of data as a 
whole.” They cite a number of macroeconomic studies that “successfully” applied factor 
analysis in order to reduce large datasets (see Forni et al., 2001, Stock & Watson, 2002; 
Bernanke et al., 2005). 
The identification strategy using factor analysis is neutral and in this respect can be viewed 
as an eclectic way of constructing explanatory variables.
4 Moreover, factor analysis partially 
overcomes measurement problems.  It  involve an “un-measurable” dimension or 
corresponding latent variables that underlie them which a single variable cannot capture, 
unless using predetermined indices build up of scaled indicators. For instance, the choice of 
a specific data series for the concept economic activity is “often arbitrary to some degree” 
                                                                 
4 In matrix notation we have x – m = LF + e, where x is a vector of random variables (items) that each have an 
average score  m,  L is a vector [matrix of basis vectors] of estimated constants or the factor the established 
factors are the factor loadings L. Because any rotation of the solutions given by factor analysis is also a solution, 
understanding of factors is difficult (e.g. we rewrite: x = LF + e with the covariance structure S = LTL’+P st. any 
L can be chosen, see Jennrich (2007). In addition to this rotation issue, m any different conceptualizations of 
factor analysis have been established for various purposes. The most broadly employed techniques are common 
factor analysis (exploratory and confirmatory, see also global and ecological) and principal components analysis. 
The approaches differ because the diagonal of the relationships matrix is replaced with communalities (here: the 
variance accounted for by several variables) in common factor analysis. In practice, the results from various 
methods are closely related (Velicer & Jackson, 1990). 8 
 
(Bernanke et al., 2006). Researchers normally use a proxy which can be correlated with an 
omitted variable, which in turn hampers causal interference.  
Unfortunately there is no unique way to identify the number of factors (Jöreskog, 2007). One 
commonly refer to method is the Kaiser little jiffy, which states that the number of 
eigenvalues of the correlation matrix that are above unity reflects the number of factors. 
Another way to determine the number of factors is by Cattell’s scree-plot, which plots the 
eigenvalues against their rank and number of factors is derived from the “elbow” of the 
curve. Maximum likelihood procedures also have been developed, but t here is always a 
theoretical foundation needed for the naming of factors. 
In order to obtain factors, first an un-rotated factor matrix is estimated. The next step is to 
estimate a rotated factor matrix, which is the object of interpretation. The factor loadings 
measure which variables or items are involved in which factor and to what extent variations 
influence the factor, such that they have a similar interpretation as the correlation 
coefficients. The communality (h
2) displays the proportion of a variable’s total variation that 
is involved in the patterns and thus delineates a measure of “uniqueness”. It is calculated for 
each variable by summing up the squared factor loadings. The percent of common variance 
indicates how the data pattern is allocated among the different factors. The first factor or 
component accounts for a maximum amount of variability in the data, and each succeeding 
one comprises as much of the remaining variability. The observed variables are modeled as 
linear combinations of the factors with additional error terms (non-linear methods have 
been developed, e.g. Wall and Amemiya (2007).  
3.2 Econometics 
Taken from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, a panel dataset for 31 provinces from 
1995 to 2006 is employed to examine the location choice of FDI across China. We consider 
the investment decision of a foreign firm in a two-stage game, which is pointed out to be an 
important aspect of choosing conceptually appropriate FDI variable in  Navaretti and 
Venables (2004), by investigating two FDI related dependent variables. The number of 
foreign funded firms (FFE) represents the stage that firms decide whether or not to invest in 9 
 
a province, while the amount of total investment of foreign funded enterprises helps to 
explore how these firms choose production levels if production is established. Dynamics of 
dependent variables are deployed in Figure 1 (Figures in Appendix).  
As for explanatory variables, we derive four latent factors: institutions (F1), labor costs (F2), 
geography (F3), and market potential (F4), based on factor analysis which captures variability 
among a large number of observed variables in terms of fewer dimensions.
5 Table 1 (in 
Appendix) lists items and their loadings to subjective factors. The higher the loading the 
more variation of the item is explained by a specific underlying factor.  Proportion of 
variation explained by each factor is presented by a pie chart in Figure 2. Specifically, in this 
paper we use a relatively wide concept of institutions which covers infrastructure of 
transportation and communication, as well as quality of government and rule of law. 
Although many studies are focused on the latter, our data support  La Porta and others 
(1999) in which as an important output of public goods infrastructural quality measures 
government performance. (See more discussion on labor costs factor in Appendix).  
Following the standard process of empirical research, we first test panel unit root and panel 
cointegration. Tests show that all the series are I (1) and coint egrated in the long run. With 
reduced number of variables from factor analysis we apply the fixed effects estimation to 
control for time-invariant province characteristics. Between estimation is also used to show 
the difference across provinces in attracting FDI on the average level. Given the potential 
existence of reversal causation, we then employ GMM to solve the problem of endogeneity.  
For example, since for the same productivity level foreign firms usually pay more to attract 
labor force, foreign investment may raise the local labor costs. When low labor costs help to 
draw more FDI, methods like the fixed effects estimation are likely to underestimate the 
impact of labor costs on FDI. With the assumption that current endogenous independent 
variables are not correlated with the future realization of the error term, internal 
instruments which generally satisfy instruments relevance are valid to obtain reliable 
estimation results. Given the first-order autocorrelation in our data, we use the lagged two 
years variables as internal instruments. Finally, we perform various robustness checks on 
                                                                 
5 We applied the two discussed criteria, namely the Kaiser little jiffy based on eigenvalues, and the Cattell scree-
plot, which both indicated the use of four factors. 10 
 
sub-sample study of the eastern and western China, extended factors with specific items, 
and alternative dependent variables. 
4. Estimation results 
Table 2 presents the fixed effects estimation (with time effects) and between estimation 
results of using both dependent variables. Explanatory variables have different effects on 
two stages of FDI investment. Over years, higher institutional quality and larger market size 
in a province attract more foreign investors to establish firms there. When the location 
decision is made, however, all factors are irrelevant to the yearly amount of investment. 
Cross provinces, all other factors except for labor costs determine both the province chosen 
decision of foreign investors and the amount of investment. Such results seem not very 
plausible. For instance, the insignificant effect of labor costs is not consistent with the fact 
that a large proportion of FDI to China is driven by vertical specialization. One explanation 
for this result is: although foreign firms choose China as host country for its low labor costs, 
they are less concerned about this factor when locate investment in Chinese provinces that 
overall have sufficient low production costs. However, the impact of labor costs is also 
possible to be underestimated if reversal causality is present. Not only labor costs can affect 
FDI, location choice of foreign firms may also change the local labor costs. Without 
controlling for such issue, regression of using endogenous labor costs gives biased results. In 
our case the second reason is more promising, because results in Table 2 show similarly 
downward biased effects of market size and institutions. 
Taking endogeneity into account, we apply lagged explanatory variables as internal 
instruments and show less biased GMM estimation results in Table 3. All regressions control 
for time and province-specific effects. In line with theoretical predications foreign investors 
choose and invest more in provinces with better institutions, lower labor costs, and larger 
market size. Significantly negative impact of labor costs and positive impact of market 
potential in Columns (1) and (3) provide empirical evidence of the coexistence of vertical FDI 
and horizontal FDI in China. Both the magnitude and the significance level of coefficients 
indicate that labor costs are the most important determinant of FDI across China. Although 
geography seems not to be a significant FDI determinant, its impact may be captured by 11 
 
other factors. For example, whether or not a province is on the coast is also represented by 
the preferential policy indicator in the institutional factor. Furthermore, the effect of 
institutions is found to be dependent on other factors like labor costs and market size. First, 
Column (2) shows that in the absence of good institutions the change of labor costs does not 
matter for attracting FDI. Since vertical FDI relies on both infrastructure and labor costs, the 
impact of low labor costs is more predominant in provinces with better infrastructure. 
Conditional on local business environment labor costs are significant to determine the 
production level in Column (4). Second, the positive effects of institutions and market size on 
FDI are complementary for each other. The effect of market size is larger when institutional 
quality is improved; meanwhile  institutions are more important  when market size is 
enlarged. Specifically, infrastructure is crucial for distribution of products sold in the local 
market, and foreign investors care more about local rule of rule if they have larger volume of 
local trade.  Finally, provincial institutions have larger impact on attracting more foreign 
firms because it is the first-stage of FDI that foreign investors choose investment 
environment. After commencing production, institutions have to work with labor costs and 
market size to affect the amount of foreign investment. 
Table 2: Fixed and between estimation results 
  Number of FDI firms (log)  Amount of FDI (log) 
  Within  Between  Within  Between 
Institution 
0.1299  1.0588***  0.0148  1.1360*** 
 
(0.0805)  (0.2038)  (0.1068)  (0.2079) 
Labor costs 
-0.3118  0.2251  -0.3275  0.2168 
 
(0.3018)  (0.1792)  (0.3961)  (0.1828) 
Market 
0.1480*  0.7209***  0.1023  0.7906*** 
 
(0.0768)  (0.2089)  (0.0954)  (0.2131) 
Geography 
-0.0162  0.4955***  0.1724  0.4487** 
 





Table 3: GMM results 
  Number of FDI firms (log)  Amount of FDI (log) 
  Basic  Interactions  Basic  Interactions 
Institution  0.0871***  0.1339***  -0.0812  -0.0733 
  (0.0287)  (0.0463)  (0.0645)  (0.0750) 
Labor costs  -0.9996***  -0.7708***  -1.2290***  -1.1596*** 
  (0.2106)  (0.2792)  (0.4789 )  (0.4471) 
Market  0.2777***  0.1814***  0.2181***  0.1463 
  (0.0370)  (0.0625)  (0.0856)  (0.0995) 
Inst*Costs    -0.0331**    -0.0810*** 
    (0.0168)    (0.0313) 
Inst*Market    0.0308**    0.0194 
    (0.0136)    (0.0226) 
Geography  -0.0455  -0.0481  0.0023  -0.0150 
  (0.0743)  (0.0741)  (0.1272)  (0.1134) 
Jointly significance    All significant    All significant 
Endogeneity test 
(null: exogenous) 
p: 0.0368  p: 0.0773  p: 0.0000  p: 0.0000 
 
5. Robustness 
Given the huge geographic and economic disparities between Chinese eastern and western 
parts, we further explore regional distribution of FDI by sub-sample study. Then specific 
items of factor 1 are incorporate into regressions for robustness. Tests results also confirm 
that our basic findings hold for various dependent variables. 
5.1 East and West 
For sub-sample study we group provinces into East (13 provinces: Beijing,  Fujian, 
Guangdong, Hainan,  Hebei, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Jilin, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Zhejiang) and West (18 provinces). Although these two groups have same common 
factors which are institutions, labor costs, market, and geography, they have different factor 
structures (see Appendix). Therefore, we generate factors for the east region and the west 
region, respectively. Figure 12 demonstrates the dynamics of each factor over time for both 
the east and west. With similar trend of development, eastern provinces have advantage in 13 
 
better institutions and larger market size. The labor costs are initially lower in the west of 
China but increase dramatically with a steeper slope in recent years. 
GMM results in  Table  4 indicate that the east and the west have different comparative 
advantages to attract FDI. Although labor costs are important in both regions, foreign firms 
located in the west are driven by geographical factor like natural resources while institutions 
and market potential have large impact on FDI in the east. In the east better institutions 
facilitate vertical FDI, which attract more foreign investors and induce them to increase 
investment level. Local market size is not significant in Column (2) to attract foreign firms in 
western provinces, because foreign investors may produce in the west and transport goods 
produced to the east either for larger market or exports. However, once production has 
been set up, larger local market raises the production level to meet the existing local 
demand. Interestingly, negative effect of institutions on the amount invested shows that 
foreign investors may give incentives to local governments to provide better institutions by 
increasing the amount of investment. If local institutions are already very good, they do not 
have to invest extra money to enhance it.  
Table 4: Sub-sample study 
  Number of FDI firms (log)  Amount of FDI (log) 
  East  West  East  West 
Institution  0.4805***  0.0010  -0.1791***  -0.0225 
  (0.1150)  (0.0574)  (0.0651)  (0.0760) 
Labor costs  -1.2669***  -0.9329**  -1.7975***  -1.0220*** 
  (0.2317)  (0.4276)  (0.3187)  (0.3828) 
Market  0.3999***  0.1020  0.3645***  0.6259** 
  (0.0642)  (0.2407)  (0.0905)  (0.2752) 
Geography  -0.0081  -0.3762***  0.1920  -0.6926*** 
  (0.0869)  (0.1121)  (0.1325)  (0.1641) 
 
Table 5 illustrates interactive effects of FDI determinants. When foreign investors choose the 
west to produce for domestic trade, in the absence of good institutions such as good 
transportation and communication labor costs in the west have minor effect on attracting 
FDI in Column (2). After the location is chosen, the amount of investment is affected by 
market potential and labor costs in both east and west regions. The negative within-sample 
effect of initial institutional quality on incentives to the local government through FDI is 14 
 
again found in the east (the second stage), which is opposite to the positive impact of good 
institutions on attracting FDI firms (the first stage).  
Table 5: Sub-sample study with interactions 
  Number of FDI firms (log)  Amount of FDI (log) 
  East  West  East  West 
Institution  0.0730  0.5998  0.0828  -0.0981  -0.0850  0.2574 
  (0.0916)  (0.4601)  (0.0874)  (0.1196)  (0.0915)  (0.1801) 
Labor costs  -1.1494***  0.1046  -1.1232***  -1.5981***  -1.0111***  -0.3723 
  (0.3278)  (0.8979)  (0.3551)  (0.4590)  (0.3433)  (0.5854) 
Market  0.2097**  0.8341  0.1238  0.4682***  0.4552**  0.8378** 
  (0.1038)  (0.6025)  (0.0922)  (0.1061)  (0.2295)  (0.3449) 
Inst*Costs  -0.0879**  -0.1287  -0.2069***    0.0569   
  (0.0387)  (0.1028)  (0.0472)    (0.0400)   
Inst*Market  0.0538  -0.1985    -0.0635    -0.1214 
  (0.0480)  (0.1499)    (0.0597)    (0.0739) 
Geography  -0.0755  -0.3381**  0.0990  0.2249*  -0.6794***  -0.6512*** 


























5.2 Specified factor institutions 
Factor analysis indicates that factor 1 comprises variation of infrastructure and that of 
governance variables (Table 1.1 in Appendix).  Table  6 shows  detailed information on 
institutional impact by analyzing the two sub-dimensions of factor 1. 
First, interactions in Column (2) imply that the significantly positive impact of institutions on 
the number of FDI firms comes from the aspect of infrastructural quality. Given the 
significant position of China’s domestic and overseas vertical integration, foreign investors 
are more concerned with local transportation and communication. On the contrary, if the 
locational choice has been made, investment and production level are more influenced by 
the quality of government and rule of law. It is reasonable that governance especially plays a 
great role in the second stage of FDI, since property rights protection and contract 
enforcement environment are crucial to alleviate externalities, such as inefficient production 
level caused by hold-up problem, in joint  production. Finally, in Column (4) we find an 
unexpected interaction from governance and market. Contrary to a complementary relation 15 
 
between institutions and markets in basic results, market power and governance are 
substitute for each other in coordinating economic activity. When market has sufficient 
power to tackle with the hassles in contracts, external enforcement from the government 
loses its importance.    
Table 6: GMM results of specified Factor 1 
  Number of FDI firms (log)  Amount of FDI (log) 
  Basic  Interactions  Basic  Interactions 
Infrastructure  0.1569***  0.2102**  -0.0609  0.1306 
  (0.0482)  (0.1026)  (0.0770)  (0.1349) 
Governance  0.1366  -0.0280  0.2380  0.2189 
  (0.1558)  (0.3085)  (0.2462)  (0.3688) 
Labor costs  -0.9343***  -0.7935**  -1.1894***  -1.1823*** 
  (0.2305)  (0.3239)  (0.3479)  (0.4068) 
Market  0.2441***  0.4337**  0.1609*  0.5882** 
  (0.0557)  (0.1934)  (0.0944)  (0.2529) 
Infra*Costs    -0.1225*    -0.1254 
    (0.0744)    (0.0872) 
Gov*Costs    -0.1997    -0.1119 
    (0.1707)    (0.2043) 
Infra*Market    0.0089    -0.0106 
    (0.0227)    (0.0337) 
Gov*Market    -0.0993    -0.2079*** 
    (0.0637)    (0.0766) 
Geography  -0.0561  0.0185  -0.0358  0.0534 
  (0.0923)  (0.1256)  (0.1377)  (0.1585) 
Jointly 
significance 
  All significant but 
Policy  
  All significant 
but infrastructure 
5.3 Alternative FDI variables 
Table 7 shows GMM estimation results of using various FDI dependent variables which are 
FDI inflows, registered capital of foreign funded firms, number of people employed by FDI 
firms, and a factor based on all FDI related variables. Effects of labor costs and market 
potential are consistent across all panels. However, the impact of institutions depends on 
the choice of dependent variable. First, the quality of institutions has different impact on 
different stages of FDI process, which cannot be reflected by using variables like FDI inflows. 
Second, more complex nonlinear relation between institutions and FDI is expected. If foreign 
firms strategically react to local institutional quality by providing incentives to local 
government, we find insignificant or even negative relationship between institutional quality 
and shares of foreign investors.       16 
 
Table 7: Alternative dependent variables 




An overall FDI 
factor 
Institution  -0.2053  -0.0611  0.1767***  0.4890*** 
  (0.2907)  (0.0389)  (0.0413)  (0.0779) 
Labor costs  -4.2849**  -1.2621***  -0.3590*  -1.2185*** 
  (1.9532)  (0.2928)  (0.2153)  (0.4487) 
Market  0.35240*  0.2447***  0.1263***  0.4430*** 
  (0.1884)  (0.0511)  (0.0484)  (0.0879) 
Geography  -0.2888  -0.0549  -0.2001**  0.2090** 
  (0 .2540)  (0.0958)  (0.0834)  (0.0983) 
5.4 Looking deeper into regional comparative advantage 
Given loadings of items in factor analysis, we identify factor 2 as labor costs which account 
for both productivity and wage. Curves of factor 2 on wages and labor productivity in foreign 
related firms support this argument. Graphic results indicate that labor costs are jointly 
determined by wages and productivity. First and not surprisingly, Figure 3 shows a negative 
relationship between labor costs and productivity. Moreover, in Figure 4 the increase of 
productivity may dominate the growth of wages in the low wage level, and therefore factor 
2 (labor costs) decreases with wages. When wages are high, however, the effect of wages 
outweighs that of productivity and causes high labor costs. Finally, the similar dynamics of 
our factor 2 and unit labor costs manufacturing index of China by Dullien (2005) in Figure 5 
further prove that categorizing factor 2 as labor costs is convincing. 
 Looking at variables loaded to classify our factor 2, we find that productivity is represented 
by education, and more interestingly, by different levels of education. Specifically, basic 
education (primary and junior high school education) and high education (senior high school 
and higher education) have different paths to affect labor productivity. Figure 6 and Figure 7 
show that high education enhances efficiency in production, whereas basic education has 
negative or insignificant effect on productivity. Workers with higher education are able to 
use physical capital more efficiently and their capability to absolve and imitate new 
techniques allows for further improvement in productivity. However, such positive role of 
higher education may not be observed for basic education in China. First, low-educated 
people are hard to exert impact on technical progress by innovation. Second, since low-17 
 
efficient state-owned firms pay more to workers with low education, unskilled workers 
prefer to move out of non-stated-owned firms (Yue 2003; Zheng & Hu 2004). Low-educated 
workers in foreign related firms lack incentives to put efforts into production. Meanwhile, 
education has impact on labor costs through wages, which is illustrated in Figures 8 and 9. 
Wage compensation increases with high education, while a complex U-shape relationship 
between basic education and wages exists. The possible reason for such nonlinear 
relationship is that the negative effect of labor endowment on wages first dominates when 
the pool of labor (with minimum required skills) is small, but with more workers available it 
is replaced by the positive correlation between wages required and average education level.  
The overall effects of education on factor 2 are shown in Figures 10 and 11. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have analyzed recent FDI inflows in China at the provincial level. Our 
approach has been eclectic. Informed by a literature that stresses many variables which are 
correlated with FDI flows, we run a factor analysis to establish unbiased regressors for which 
Chinese provinces differ. Broadly speaking, on top of geographical fixed factors, regions 
differ in labor costs, market potential, and hard and soft institutions. We then perform a 
‘horserace’ among these factors to see which factors matter most. We show that for the 
1995-2006 period, labor costs and infrastructure (and especially when combined) are 
important for attracting FDI. 
These results fit against a background of FDI diffusion away from the Pearl River Delta 
towards the Shanghai and Beijing region. Increasingly the Beijing region is able to capture a 
larger share of FDI by effectively tapping into cheap labor from the inner provinces. On top 
of that, it reflects a shifting towards inner provinces, especially by firms from Taiwan and 
Hong Kong. For these firms, cost advantages are important assets in competitive world 
markets, so that they shift to cheaper northern and western location when infrastructure is 
ready. 
Our study certainly does not contradict the relations found in other papers. A main 
difference is that we focus on a time frame where the Chinese government has changed 18 
 
course and the coastal regions became relatively less attractive for foreign investors.  After 
setting up the export processing zones, the Chinese government in the 1990s has made 
great strides to diffuse FDI. First, this succeeded towards t he other eastern provinces. 
However, according to very recent figures, economic growth is now higher in the northern 
and western provinces. In addition, our  empirical findings indicate  that over  time 
improvements in infrastructure, or keeping labor costs low are becoming more important. 
Can we draw lessons for the ongoing policy debate on the relative importance of geography, 
big push development, and institutions? Clearly, we have to be cautious here. However, 
from our analysis it becomes clear that geography is not all important if big push efforts in 
infrastructure are made. Foreign investors do not stick to location and agglomeration effects 
are not that strong that the inhibit the dispersion of FDI across regions. In addition, in China 
soft institutions (such as differences in local corruption and education) do not seem to play 
an important role other that they tend to go together with ‘hard’ institutions such as 
infrastructural improvements. This calls into question to what extent institutional reform 
alone in China as well as in other parts of the world is able to create FDI flows.  
However, the analysis may also point to a more critical observation, one that is shared in 
much of the management literature on investing in China. In  the data, there is the 
suggestion that labor costs and logistics remain the most important driving for foreigners to 
invest in China. This may also be because higher valued activities are still seen as too risky. 
The obvious reason is a lack of property rights protection, so that assembly based on higher 
skills (and, hence, higher labor costs and more schooling) remains unprofitable for foreign 
firms in the long run. A second reason is a lack of local management skills to  perform 
integrated system production processes. Lastly, there is a often heard complaint that in joint 
ventures, ailing domestic firms are pushed by local politicians for inclusion in joint venture 
production. All these issues suggest that the dominant strategy for foreign firms still is to 
make use of cheap and disciplined labor, so that the next step towards high value added 
production is jet to come.  19 
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Table 1: Rotated factor loadings 
Variables  Factor1  Factor2  Factor3  Factor4  Factor5  Uniqueness
Capital  0.8434  0.2703        0.0847 
City road length  0.7277  0.3637        0.1491 
City road area  0.8298  0.3185        0.0976 
Civil vehicle  0.8964  0.2998        0.0541 
freight  0.6493  0.4972        0.2225 
Gov Expenditure  0.9243          0.0400 
Private vehicle  0.9004          0.0924 
Ways (train, water, highway)  0.5331  0.4195    -0.3019  0.3236  0.2627 
Exports  0.8666        -0.3747  0.0566 
Imports  0.8010      0.3547  -0.3805  0.0712 
Long telephone  0.9185          0.0741 
Local telephone  0.9012  0.2832        0.0447 
Mobile  0.9650          0.0415 
Cable  0.6272      -0.3505  0.4000  0.1804 
Patent registered  0.8882        -0.2647  0.0678 
GRP per capita  0.5124  -0.3228    0.7091    0.0666 
Wage  0.6450  -0.3610    0.5300    0.0816 
Consumption household  0.5207  -0.3316    0.6983    0.0865 
Tech market transaction   0.3244      0.8662    0.1183 
Population  0.3394  0.8953        0.0301 
Workers  0.3422  0.7798        0.0738 
Primary school    0.8872        0.1078 23 
 
Primary enrolment    0.9106        0.0539 
Junior high school    0.9356        0.0562 
Junior enrolment  0.3376  0.8573        0.0906 
Senior high school  0.4405  0.8006        0.0837 
Senior enrolment   0.6481  0.5298      0.4634  0.0622 
Higher education institutions  0.6470  0.4633    0.2672  0.3995  0.0961 
Higher education enrolment  0.7497        0.5354  0.0606 
Humidity      0.9032      0.1321 
Sunshine    -0.3354  -0.7836      0.2208 
Temperature      0.8711      0.1514 
Area      -0.4013  -0.2550    0.2192 
Precipitation      0.8404      0.2164 
Natural resource      -0.5645      0.2023 
NERI index  0.6980    0.3581  0.4004    0.1099 
Index property protection  0.3781      0.5757    0.1521 
Index government intervention     0.4912    0.3469  0.2344 
Index corruption            0.2553 
Index contract enforcement            0.2229 
PPI (Preferential Policy Index)  0.4026  -0.2636  0.4611      0.2464 
Minority population        -0.2814    0.3903 














  Factor1  Factor2  Factor3  Factor4 
Factor1  0.8758     0.3779     0.1495     0.1940    
Factor2  -0.2418     0.8030     0.0956    -0.4952    
Factor3  -0.1533    -0.0529     0.9568     0.1405   
Factor4  0.2811    -0.3312     0.1500    -0.3551    
Variable  Obs          Mean  Std. Dev.         Min  Max 
Factor1  309  -2.03e-10  1  -1.0979      7.0008 
Factor2  309  1.07e-09  1  -1.6994     3.1234 
Factor3  309  -5.12e-11            1  -2.0398    2.2674 
Factor4  309  1.18e-09             1  -1.5178       8.2555 25 
 
 









City road length  0.8459  0.2241  0.2343 
City road area  0.9151    0.1328 
Freight  0.7893    0.3644 
Ways  0.6738  -0.5293  0.2658 
Long telephone  0.9272    0.1395 
Local telephone   0.9661    0.0625 
Mobile  0.9367    0.1221 
Cable  0.6854  -0.5204  0.2594 
Patent  0.8509  0.2669  0.2047 
NERI index  0.7276  0.4880  0.2324 
Index property protection  0.3223  0.8060  0.2465 
Index government intervention     -0.2028  0.9474 
Index corruption    -0.3620  0.8376 
Index contract enforcement    -0.3276  0.8921 
PPI (Preferential Policy Index)  0.3601  0.5579  0.5590 
Minority population    -0.6655  0.5433 
(blanks represent abs(loading<0.2) ; No. of observations: 309 
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Capital  0.9014        0.0364 
City road length  0.7869  0.4016      0.1479 
City road area  0.8739  0.3353      0.0857 
Civil vehicle  0.8800  0.2947      0.0535 
freight  0.7104  0.5449      0.1464 
Gov Expenditure  0.9114      0.3266  0.0400 
Private vehicle  0.8769        0.1077 
Ways (train, water, highway)  0.7030  0.4712      0.1293 
Exports  0.7600    0.3924  0.3642  0.0727 
Imports  0.6878    0.2720  0.5682  0.0817 
Long telephone  0.8191  0.2666  0.2683    0.0676 
Local telephone  0.9428        0.0340 
Mobile  0.9223        0.0528 
Cable  0.7595        0.1213 
Patent registered  0.7924    0.2984  0.3854  0.0835 
GRP per capita  0.3681  -0.3982    0.7145  0.0831 
Wage  0.5804  -0.3901    0.5958  0.1023 
Consumption household  0.3490  -0.3946    0.7471  0.1037 
Tech market transaction   0.2609      0.7002  0.3003 
Population  0.5085  0.8169      0.0208 
Workers  0.3093  0.8234      0.1487 
Primary school    0.9266      0.0886 30 
 
Primary enrolment  0.3074  0.9055      0.0325 
Junior high school  0.2911  0.8819    -0.2740  0.0457 
Junior enrolment  0.4260  0.8379      0.0624 
Senior high school  0.5482  0.7470      0.0947 
Senior enrolment   0.8083  0.4569      0.0339 
Higher education institutions  0.8060  0.2868  -0.3074    0.1093 
Higher education enrolment  0.9416        0.0240 
Humidity      0.8913    0.1597 
Sunshine      -0.8873    0.1289 
Temperature      0.8408    0.0912 
Area          0.0536 
Precipitation      0.9041    0.1532 
Natural resource      -0.5162    0.1185 
NERI index  0.6475    0.4314  0.3714  0.1169 
Index property protection        0.8301  0.2452 
Index government 
intervention   -0.2533  -0.7239    -0.3336  0.2374 
Index corruption    -0.3441    -0.2800  0.1798 
Index contract enforcement      0.4524    0.4063 
PPI (Preferential Policy Index)     0.8479    0.2400 
Minority population        -0.3741  0.2801 





















Capital  0.8729  0.3794      0.0764 
City road length  0.5027  0.4227  0.3272    0.2014 
City road area  0.7058  0.3835      0.1344 
Civil vehicle  0.8171  0.4928      0.0710 
freight  0.5353  0.5522  -0.3391    0.2605 
Gov Expenditure  0.9570      0.4348  0.0286 
Private vehicle  0.8529  0.3209    0.2600  0.1075 
Ways (train, water, highway)  0.7524  0.2546      0.2706 
Exports  0.8671      0.3604  0.1763 
Imports  0.8747      0.4511  0.1690 
Long telephone  0.8649  0.3172      0.0923 
Local telephone  0.8874  0.3696      0.0546 
Mobile  0.9495        0.0686 
Cable  0.8684        0.1595 
Patent registered  0.7116  0.5163      0.1209 
GRP per capita  0.8303  -0.2528    0.8090  0.1362 
Wage  0.4457  -0.4569    0.8750  0.1450 
Consumption household  0.3420  -0.2663    0.8099  0.1124 
Tech market transaction   0.4699  0.3682      0.1464 
Population  0.3432  0.8557  0.2789    0.0538 
Workers    0.9145      0.0763 
Primary school    0.9091      0.1265 
Primary enrolment    0.8898  0.2772    0.0928 32 
 
Junior high school  0.3148  0.9022      0.0528 
Junior enrolment  0.4425  0.7839      0.1108 
Senior high school  0.4819  0.7839  0.2582    0.0705 
Senior enrolment   0.8294  0.4214      0.0897 
Higher education institutions  0.7182  0.5103  0.2692    0.0960 
Higher education enrolment  0.8527        0.1185 
Humidity    0.3939  0.7823    0.1340 
Sunshine    -0.4917  -0.6630    0.2242 
Temperature    0.4023  0.6798    0.1752 
Area    -0.2586      0.1514 
Precipitation    0.2506  0.6839    0.3050 
Natural resource          0.1643 
NERI index  0.6963    0.2500  0.4456  0.1350 
Index property protection        -0.3013  0.4122 
Index government intervention       0.8231    0.2445 
Index corruption        0.5701  0.2125 
Index contract enforcement          0.2319 
PPI (Preferential Policy Index)  0.5371    0.2755    0.5290 
Minority population    -0.2535      0.1156 
(blanks represent abs(loading)<0.25; No. of Observations: 169 
 
 
 
 
 